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Data leakagea b s t r a c t
We present a new form of online tracking: explicit, yet unnecessary leakage of personal information and
detailed shopping habits from online merchants to payment providers. In contrast to the widely debated
tracking of Web browsing, online shops make it impossible for their customers to avoid this dissemina-
tion of their data. We record and analyse leakage patterns for the 881 most popular US Web shops sam-
pled from actual Web users’ online purchase sessions. More than half of the sites we analysed shared
product names and details with PayPal, allowing the payment provider to build up fine-grained and com-
prehensive consumption profiles about its clients across the sites they buy from, subscribe to, or donate
to. In addition, PayPal forwards customers’ shopping details to Omniture, a third-party data aggregator
with even larger tracking reach than PayPal itself. Leakage to PayPal is commonplace across product cat-
egories and includes details of medication or sex toys. We provide recommendations for merchants.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Online payment providers process rich transaction data
Online payment handling is a key enabler for electronic retail-
ing and a growing business opportunity as mobile commerce takes
off. Contactless payments have been pioneered in successful yet
isolated applications, such as public transport (e.g., Oyster in Lon-
don, touch & travel in Germany) or entertainment (e.g., Disneyland
Finextra Research 2009, Starbucks (Hamblen 2012). General-
purpose digital wallets and near-field payment capabilities are
now integrated in all major mobile phone operating systems
(Google 2014, Microsoft 2014, Apple Inc. 2014) and promise wider
adoption across verticals.
Payment providers are intermediaries between merchants and
their customers who buy and then pay for goods and services. As
intermediaries, payment providers necessarily gain insight intothe transaction as they process personal information, just like the
delivery company will need the customer’s postal address. The
minimum data requirements for payment handling are the order
total, the receiving merchant and an authenticated payment
instrument. This corresponds to data items traditionally collected
during credit card transactions. However, a much richer set of data
items becomes available for online, mobile and in-app purchases,
including an itemised statement of the goods purchased or infor-
mation about the buyer, allowing value-added services. Amongst
credit card issuers, these data are known as Level II and III but have
been rarely available for point-of-sale or transactions (Software
Inc. 2014).
The move towards richer transaction details is driven and
enabled by three factors: first, the extended role of payment provi-
ders as shopping cart solutions, so that itemised data availability
becomes a necessity; second, technically enabled by the lack of
data length restrictions found in legacy payment processing; third,
the mining of detailed transaction data for fraud detection and pre-
vention (Klarna 2013). For instance, MasterCard reported accep-
tance by over 19 million merchants worldwide back in 2001, but
only 1% would be able to ‘‘capture and transmit Level II and Level
III data”. These include itemised product descriptions, quantities
and prices (MasterCard 2001), but still fewer details than what
new online payment providers collect.
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Fraud detection and prevention is the most-publicised benefit
of collecting and inspecting purchase details. The rise of riskier
card-not-present transactions over the Web or on mobile has
mandated new efforts in fighting crime. Between 2002 and
2012, the most recent year for which data are available, the
annual fraud losses on UK-issued payment cards has decreased
from £427 million to £388 million. Whereas counterfeit, lost or
stolen card fraud has decreased from £257m to £97m (62%)
during that period, card-not-present fraud for electronic com-
merce alone has quintupled from £28m to £140m and now
accounts for the majority of losses (Financial Fraud Action UK
2013). Despite continued e-commerce growth, fraud volumes
have been decreasing since their peak in 2008. The industry attri-
butes these accomplishments to automated cardholder address
verification and card security codes, to initiatives like Master-
Card’s SecureCode and Verified by Visa, and to the ‘‘effectiveness
and sophistication of customer-profiling neural networks that can
identify unusual spending patterns” (Financial Fraud Action UK
2013). The required collection of details about buyers and their
purchases is therefore attractive for payment providers and mer-
chants who can benefit from lower fees. As another example, the
payment provider Klarna allows customers to pay after order
placement and shipping. At the same time, it absorbs the credit
risk for merchants and controls losses through risk assessment
based on diverse factors, including purchase details (Gustafsson
and Magnusson 2014).
Fighting payment fraud is only one of many more applications
for purchase information. Payment providers have a twofold incen-
tive to collect details for the transactions they process. One the one
hand, they can use the additional data for operational efficiency in
a broad sense; on the other hand, they can offer convenience fea-
tures to consumers.1.2.1. Operational efficiency
Payment providers operate in a highly regulated environment
and some obligations cannot be fulfilled efficiently unless purchase
details are known. They must comply with tax and legal require-
ments, such as products prohibited in certain regions (e.g., gam-
bling, alcohol sales) or money laundering. They must also detect
and prevent crime, such as fraud and policy violations. As an exam-
ple of transaction monitoring, PayPal has ‘‘hundreds of highly
trained specialists working around the clock to prevent fraudulent
activity and identify suspicious transactions” (PayPal 2015). Details
from past transactions are also a shared secret between the provi-
der and its customers, and can be used for additional authentica-
tion or account recovery. Purchase details can be monetised for
product innovation, as market research, and through direct mar-
keting on an individualised basis. Insofar as payment providers
provide escrow services and help buyers who have been defrauded
by the merchant, transaction details can be used for risk screening.
For instance, PayPal’s buyer protection only covers certain physical
goods. Whilst mainly in the self-interest of the provider, opera-
tional efficiency enables payment services for consumers and mer-
chants at acceptable fees in the long run.1.2.2. Convenience features
Buyers can enjoy peace of mind when their purchase details are
displayed back to them in the very moment when making the pay-
ment. They can also inspect the transaction history in their account
and get a detailed statement of previous purchases. When payment
providers collect purchase details, they can offer sought-after
spending reports and financial self-analysis.1.3. Privacy concerns
The large-scale collection and processing of personal
details causes privacy concerns. Concern is no longer limited to tra-
ditional items of personal information like address or demograph-
ics, but increasingly about consumption behaviour. Despite the
quantified-self movement and although Web users volunteer per-
sonal information with high prevalence (e.g., 55% knowingly
entered their weekly spending behaviour into a Web form where
this item was optional, Malheiros et al. 2013), extended records
of usage data are problematic. Widespread tracking of browsing
patterns byWebsites and aggregators has raised attention in main-
stream media (WSJ Online 2013). Browsing history leaked to
advertisers (TRUSTe 2009), electricity consumption recorded by
smart meters (McDaniel and McLaughlin 2009), or mobility trajec-
tories in pay-as-you-drive insurance policies (Scism 2013) have all
been found to be associated with elevated privacy concerns. Of
particular interest is shopping data, whose value is demonstrated
through myriads of loyalty card schemes. Purchase tracking now
happens across merchants and channels (online/offline) and even
if users are not enrolled in a loyalty scheme (Valentino-DeVries
and Singer-Vine 2012, Duhigg 2012).
Our research looks at the tracking capabilities of payment pro-
viders, namely PayPal. An illustrative example is provided in Figs. 1
and 4.
Our research motivation is the ability of payment providers to
collect purchase details at scale. As in the domains of Web tracking
and analytics, a small number of providers cover multipleWebsites
(merchants) and can link transactions across those. Compared to
cookie-like tracking, the privacy issues are exacerbated:
 Embedded tracking code is—in principle—ancillary to the core
functionality of the Web page and can safely be filtered out
(e.g., with ad-blockers or Tracking Protection in Internet
Explorer). Payment handling is however essential to shopping,
and users cannot complete the transaction without interacting
with the payment provider.
 Unlike browsing patterns linked to a cookie identifier, con-
sumption patterns linked to a payment method are not
pseudonymous but identifiable through offline details such as
credit card numbers or bank account details, which often
include full name.
 Payment cards or account information serve as persistent identi-
fiers, allowing longitudinal linkage of multiple transactions even
across different logins or accounts with the payment provider.
 Consumers are typically unable to evade such data collection
unless they refrain from shopping with the given merchant.
The collection of shoppers’ details is a negative externality of
the contract between the merchant and the payment provider.
 Payment handling is universal across sellers and sectors. Con-
sumer details are collected and merged across transactions even
for sensitive products and merchants. This includes pharmacies
or adult entertainment, for instance, where shoppers deliber-
ately moved out of the high street and onto theWeb in a pursuit
of privacy.
Privacy threats arise from detailed purchase patterns when
more than the minimum data required are collected. The principle
of data minimisation has long been codified in national law and
international privacy guidelines, such as the ‘‘collection limitation
principle” in the OECD privacy framework (OECD 2013) or the
Madrid Privacy Declaration (The Public Voice 2009). The principle
of data minimisation as such is now contained in the text of the
European Union’s upcoming General Data Protection Regulation
(European Commission 2012; Council of the European Union
Fig. 1. The Web shop passes the product name and item number on to PayPal.
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1.4. Theoretical background: privacy and e-commerce payment
intermediaries
The benefits of data collection by payment providers, but also
the associated privacy concerns discussed above, can be inter-
preted in the general framework of e-commerce intermediaries
and their roles.
Different streams of research, including information systems,
have extensively discussed the privacy aspects of payment inter-
mediaries between retailers and their customers since the advent
of electronic commerce in the early 2000s. Much less effort has
been devoted to examining the technical reality and evolving busi-
ness practices of this tri-party relationship.
Intermediation is a technique to overcome a trust deficit that
the seller may not adequately secure the customer’s payment
details. Using a payment provider rather than processing card
details directly thus leads to more conversions for the potentially
untrusted merchant (Heck and Vervest 1998). An intermediary
can overcome security and privacy concerns that can inhibit online
shopping. (Hoffman et al. 1999) Whilst the trust boost is the pay-
ment providers’ most important consumer-facing role, it only
applies to sellers of inferior trust than the payment provider. Web-
sites with a longer history on the Internet develop their own brand
and exhibit less prominent use of trusted third parties (Palmer
et al. 2000). Even then, merchants continue to benefit from aggre-
gation features and cost savings for set-up and ongoing transac-
tions offered by intermediaries (Bailey and Bakos 1997, Arnab
and Hutchison 2007).
The technical expertise required to interface with a payment
provider, albeit smaller than directly integrating with a credit card
acquirer, still depends on which services of the provider are used
(Section 3.1). Smaller merchants with fewer resources are often
encouraged by the providers themselves to start with simple inte-
gration methods. Efforts to ensure the security of customer
accounts vary across online industries (Bonneau and Preibusch
2010), larger, more popular, and more mature Websites have sig-
nificantly better overall privacy protection (Bonneau and
Preibusch 2009).
Insofar as payment providers bridge trust gaps, they overcome
consumers’ privacy concerns vis-à-vis the merchant. New privacy
issues are introduced, though, which have been explained above.
On an institutional level, intermediaries may be a threat to privacywhen shaping the ability to transact or adopt privacy-enhancing
solutions: Examples include PayPal blocking customers who use
Tor, a privacy-enhancing technology to hide their IP address
(Lewman 2010). PayPal has also withheld donated funds and pre-
vented further donations to WikiLeaks, an activist organisation
concerned about transparency and privacy (Poulsen 2010). Guid-
ance issued by European data protection authorities unanimously
classifies payment providers as data controllers rather than data
processors, acknowledging the control they exercise in re-
purposing customer data (Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO) 2014, Isle of Man Information Commissioner 2015).1.5. Contribution and research questions
Ahead of tightening regulation regarding data minimisation,
recognising that online payment handling is a growing market,
noting that information privacy is becoming a positive competitive
differentiator, we set out to explore the tracking capabilities of
online payment providers.
As the first kind of such investigation, the focus is on exploring
and describing current practices. We conducted the first
industry-wide, empirical survey that quantifies the flows of cus-
tomer data from N = 881 merchants to PayPal. We describe current
practices of data proliferation which can soon be deemed privacy
leaks.
PayPal is chosen as the most pervasive online payment provi-
der, covering Websites across strata of popularity (PayPal 2014a).
We investigate which items of personal data and which transaction
details merchants are sharing with PayPal as customers complete
their checkout (Figs. 1 and 4). Our goal is to quantify the preva-
lence of data flows towards PayPal and to measure the amount
of data shared above pure order totals. Our survey of the ecosystem
also looks for per-sector differences in data sharing with payment
providers or whether more popular Websites leak more or less per-
sonal details.2. Related work
Our investigation complements and expands an existing body
of literature that has empirically examined privacy and tracking
practices at large. Bonneau and Preibusch studied privacy practices
across the entire online social networking ecosystem (Bonneau and
Preibusch 2009). They found unsatisfactory privacy practices
throughout the industry, which were still better for more popular
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among different industries (Bonneau and Preibusch 2010) and
found that poor practices were commonplace regarding password
security, although merchant sites did better than newspaper sites.
Specifically for Web shops, more expensive shops were found to
collect significantly more personal details than their cheaper com-
petitors (Preibusch and Bonneau 2013).
A number of Web privacy surveys studied the private informa-
tion leakage, different tracking mechanisms and their prevalence
on the Web. Krishnamurthy and Wills show how personally iden-
tifiable information leaks via online social networks, including the
leakage by HTTP Referer header (Krishnamurthy and Wills 2009a).
Roesner et al. presented a taxonomy of third-party tracking and
developed tools for defending against tracking by social sharing
buttons (Roesner et al. 2012). Multiple researchers surveyed the
use of more advanced and resilient tracking mechanisms such as
evercookies (Soltani et al. 2010, Ayenson et al. 2011, McDonald
and Cranor 2011, Acar et al. 2014), browser fingerprinting (Acar
et al. 2014, Eckersley 2010, Nikiforakis et al. 2013, Acar et al.
2013) and cookie syncing (Acar et al. 2014, Olejnik et al. 2014),
commonly reporting on questionable practices and unexpected
prevalence of such technologies.
Researchers studying tracking on mobile platforms found that
many apps leak private information to third-party servers includ-
ing precise location, personal data and unique identifiers (Enck
et al. 2014, Hornyack et al. 2011, Gibler et al. 2012, Egele et al.
2011). A study intersecting the interface used for embedding
mobile ad libraries found that apps share highly sensitive informa-
tion such as ethnicity along with postal code, gender, age and
income (Book and Wallach 2013). The same study found a positive
correlation between app popularity and the privacy leakage. More
recently, by analysing the unprecedented amount of 1.1 million
Android apps, Viennot et al. showed how apps mishandling of
authentication tokens may lead to unauthorized access to user
data and resources on Amazon Web Services and Facebook
(Viennot et al. 2014).
Another line of research has looked into users’ reaction to
online tracking and behavioural advertising. A 2013 Pew Research
study found, motivated by the concerns about online tracking, that
86% of Internet users have tried to be anonymous online and took
some effort to avoid tracking (Rainie et al. 2013). Ur et al. found a
majority of users in their study were either fully or partially
opposed to online behavioural advertising, finding the idea smart
but creepy (Ur et al. 2012). Leon et al. studied the factors affecting
users’ willingness to share information with the advertisers and
found that perceived sensitivity of information, data-retention
policies and the scope of data use are the prominent factors
(Leon et al. 2013).
Finally, researchers looked into consumers’ privacy choices in
online shopping. Buyers of sensitive products (vibrators) were
found to pay a premium to shop with a retailer whose privacy
practices were labelled as superior by a product search engine
(Tsai et al. 2011). In the largest ever lab and field experiment in pri-
vacy economics, almost one in three Web shoppers paid one euro
extra for keeping their mobile phone number private (Jentzsch
et al. 2012). When privacy comes for free, more than 80% of con-
sumers choose the company that collects less personal information
(Jentzsch et al. 2012). Earlier results indicated that price discounts
override online shoppers’ privacy preferences (Preibusch et al.
2013).3. Methodology
We conducted a blind field experiment with 1200 shopping
Websites, by observing their inbound and outbound data flowsduring checkout. The Websites did not know they were subjected
to data capture, which followed a strict experimental protocol.
The data collection setup fleshes out the integration with PayPal,
which is described first. We then provide details on the sampling,
the experimental protocol, and describe additional data sources for
data enrichment.3.1. Background: PayPal integration and information flows
PayPal provides payment processing to merchants and has been
a pioneer to offer payment acceptance to electronic retailers,
although its product range now covers a plenitude of card and
card-less payment and identity services for online, offline, and
mobile transactions. Similar to a cloud service, PayPal’s offerings
are characterised by their ease of set-up, pay per use, and self-
service.
PayPal offers multiple ways to be embedded in the shopping
workflow, traditionally depending on the type of payment, for
instance (e.g., donations, recurring subscriptions, one-time check-
outs) (PayPal 2013a). On a technical level, there are two different
integration routes depending on how the session data are trans-
mitted from the merchant to PayPal: (1) server-to-server integra-
tion, where SOAP Web services or REST APIs are used to
communicate transaction details from the merchant to PayPal;
(2) integration via the client, where transaction parameters are
passed exclusively through the query string (GET) by means of
consumers’ browsers.
Integration via GET is simple and readily available for hosted
Websites, as no server-side communication is required. In PayPal
parlance, this integration method is called ‘‘buttons”. More sophis-
ticated methods use server-to-server communication between the
application server and the payment provider: the merchant creates
a session with the payment provider when submitting all relevant
transaction data. This session is then referenced through a session
identifier or token (‘‘EC token”), which is the only information that
the client needs to pass on (PayPal 2013b). This method requires
more technical expertise, but is less susceptible to manipulation
by the client. However, server-to-server communication cannot
be observed in a study like ours, where the client is instrumented.
It would require server logs from PayPal or the merchant (or broad-
coverage network sniffing capabilities). Also, when integrating
with PayPal through payment buttons, merchants can still hide
submitted information and prevent tampering by encrypting the
transaction parameters (PayPal 2013c).
A variant of server-to-server payment integration is the use of a
further intermediary that calls and processes the PayPal workflows
on behalf of the merchant. Such an intermediary is typically found
for more complex integration, to mediate between multiple pay-
ment methods.
Whereas encrypted buttons are encountered rarely, payment
sessions referenced via an EC token on the client side are very com-
mon (Table 3). The unobservable flow of personal information
between servers is a challenge for our research. We therefore use
personal data that PayPal displays back to the user to establish a
lower bound for the privacy invasion by the data that are transmit-
ted; this method was confirmed to be accurate during data analysis
(Section 4.5).
The ‘‘Legal Agreements for PayPal Services” (PayPal 2014b) out-
line a number of requirements for merchants. All information sub-
mitted to the API must be ‘‘true, correct, and complete” (PayPal
2013d). Whereas all fields containing personal information are
optional (PayPal 2014c,d), a ‘‘description field to identify the
goods” and a URL linking back to the original product page must
be provided for the popular Express Checkout method (PayPal
2014c).
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We sample online shops that target US consumers and pro-
vide checkout in US Dollar via PayPal. The US market is chosen
for its size and for being the home market of PayPal. We sample
popular Web shops. Practices at these online destinations matter
most as they impact a large consumer population. Stores are
identified by their URL, as occurring before the PayPal checkout
page in browser sessions. Data are collected from a sample of
Internet Explorer users who opted into share their browsing
history.
Sampling originally yielded Website domains rather than pro-
duct pages for each potential shop. These domains were ordered
and processed in decreasing order of popularity and inspected
manually as Websites may have ceased to offer PayPal, may have
shut down, may be unreachable or otherwise no longer qualify
by our sampling criteria. In particular, sampling by referrer pro-
duced false positives, such as Webmail providers or search engines.
These sites were noted and excluded. All domains were inspected
manually and if the site matched the sampling criteria, a single
product was selected to measure data leakage during checkout.
Product selection followed a simple protocol, choosing the first
available product in the first product category except sale or sea-
sonal categories.
We excluded Websites offering business services (B2B such as
email marketing campaigns), banks and insurances, and restricted
Websites which required a prior customer relationship such as
utility companies. Airline Websites were often excluded for we
were unable to complete the purchase according to our data collec-
tion protocol. EBay, PayPal internal and duplicate Websites were
excluded (e.g., homedepot.ca as a duplicate of homedepot.com).
We deliberately included Websites selling non-material goods
such as in-game purchases for extras or virtual currencies, or
online account top-ups. In line with our research agenda, we also
refrained from filtering out adult Websites.
Hosting sites (e.g., Yahoo! shops or Google Sites) were excluded
and separated from the sample for future analysis. Such sites host
multiple shops with differing implementation practices under a
single domain. A few representative sub-shops were chosen for
affiliate shops (e.g., spreadshirt.com) and shop-in-shop solutions
(e.g., atgstores.com).4. Experimental protocol
Before the main data collection, we ran a pilot study with sep-
arate 40 Websites sampled from the DMOZ/Open Directory Project
in the (English) electronics Web shops category. This seeding sam-
ple covers a broad range of lesser known online retailers, which we
inspected manually whether they offer checkout via PayPal or not.
Based on this pilot, we then established the following data collec-
tion infrastructure and process (Fig. 2).
For reliable results, a strict data collection protocol was fol-
lowed during the main data collection. The details of the experi-
mental setup and procedures are laid out in the Appendix. To
avoid contamination of the results by residual cookies or other
re-identification methods, a virtual machine was used and reset
for every recording anew. Transaction data were recorded by nav-
igating in the Web shop and to PayPal to the point of checkout;
browsing was done in Firefox and all HTTP and HTTPS traffic
was captured by mitmproxy (Mitmproxy Project 2013) and
stored. This includes GET and POST requests and the parameters
submitted with them. Web forms were completed by using the
same fictitious profile data on every site, a woman in her 40s liv-
ing in a major US city. A unique email address was used for each
Website.The entry point for each Website was the first available product
in a product category (‘department’). We excluded volatile cate-
gories such as featured items or sale promotions. Recording started
at the product page identified during sampling and finished with
the PayPal checkout screen. An example of this screen is given in
Fig. 1. We captured and archived this PayPal screen (screenshot
image and page mark-up) and manually tallied the presence of
personal and product details displayed on the page. We later tested
and confirmed the accuracy of inferring data transfer from the
screenshot (Section 4.5).
Problems that we encountered during the data collection were
recorded and dealt with consistently. For broken or unavailable
Websites, we progressed as far into the purchase as possible.
Unavailable items were substituted by the next available product
according to the product sampling procedure. Websites that
refused the existing profile data for any reason, were recorded
but later excluded from the dataset. Some Websites redirected to
a non-US version of the shop based on IP address geo-location, in
which case we tried to navigate back to the US store. When possi-
ble, we completed the checkout without registering with the
shops. Although data collection is tool-supported, there is always
a human in the loop.
After the full data analysis was completed, we reached out to a
sub-sample of online retailers to explain their point of view.
4.1. Data enrichment: adding metadata
To analyse privacy friendliness by industry, we manually and
automatically annotated the Websites in our sample with the kind
of service they offer and the products they sell. We also added met-
rics for popularity and technical quality.
4.2. Manual Categorisation of Web shops
We manually categorised the Websites as specialised in retail,
commercial services, donations, dating, events, airlines, or other if
they did not fit in any of these categories. The commercial services
Websites were further subcategorised as educational, software,
Website, or other.
Retail Web shops sell physical goods, while commercial services
are selling primarily nonphysical goods such as courses (educa-
tional), online-backups (software), or access to a Website (Website).
Donation Websites do not provide anything in return for money,
and technically need not even register the donor’s name. Although
small in number, the categories events and airlines were included
because they by nature will require more personal information
than a retail store.
4.3. Automated Categorisation of Web shops
For a more fine-grained, product-driven categorisation of Web
shops, we turned to the curated ontologies of DMOZ and AWIS
(Alexa Web Information Service). They both turned out to only
have data for the most popular Websites (35% coverage from AWIS
keywords, 48% from AWIS categories, 52% from DMOZ—53% when
combining DMOZ and AWIS), so we looked for an alternative
solution.
Exploiting Amazon.com’s status as one of the biggest ware-
houses of the Internet, we used the Amazon.com Product Advertis-
ing API (Amazon Web Services 2013) to obtain a better
classification. This is a novel approach which has been applied
for the first time in our investigation. For every URL in our dataset,
we queried the API with the HTML Meta keywords describing the
merchant Website. This yielded a list of up to ten matching prod-
ucts, for each of which one or more product categories were listed.
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Fig. 2. Steps of the data collection process; data collections are given in the lower portion.
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rithm over the returned items for each Website; the items were
sorted in descending relevance by the Amazon API.
The API also assigns exactly one node of Amazon’s product type
and product group type categories to each product. However, not
much useful information could be extracted from these, and we
largely discarded them from further investigation.
Although the Amazon product ontology was used for describing
Website categories, we retained AWIS to assess popularity and
technical quality, indicated by the ‘traffic rank’ and ‘speed per-
centile’ respectively.4.4. Data sources
In summary, we use the following data sources for our analysis:
 A list of online retailers offering PayPal checkout, sampled from
actually visited Web shops in real browsing sessions, as per the
method described above.
 Website metadata from external sources: (1) Website popular-
ity, maturity and audience demographics licensed from the
Alexa Web Information Service (AWIS) API; (2) manual and
automated merchant categorisation via Website keywords and
Amazon Product API.
 From captured HTTP traffic to the server: a trace of all personal
information sent from the merchant to PayPal via query string
or the presence of a server-initiated transaction session, as
detected by the submission of a session token. Transcribed
screen-shots of the PayPal login page, showing personal data
that PayPal displays back to the customer, which was confirmed
to equal data received from the merchant.
 From captured HTTP traffic from the server and from saved
HTML pages: data on third-party trackers (Omniture) deployed
on PayPal’s checkout pages.
 Written responses received from the merchants we asked for
clarification on their data sharing practices with PayPal.
4.5. Data analysis
From an initial list of 1200 shopping domains, we successfully
collected the data for 881 merchant Websites: HTTP(S) traffic
traces until reaching the PayPal login page, and screenshot upon
arrival. These parsed logs and transcribed screenshots were con-firmed to be accurate evidence of personal identifiable information
(PII) leakage.
First, we describe our data set in terms of PayPal API implemen-
tations and predominant patterns of PII leakage. We also explain
how we used machine learning techniques to reduce the multitude
of these patterns to a manageable number. Second, we explain the
data enrichment we performed. We looked for predominant prac-
tices on the Internet by adding metadata to our data set, allowing
us to slice the data set by Website and product categories.4.6. Descriptive statistics and cluster analysis
4.6.1. Endpoints and tokens
As described in the Background section, there are two basic
methods for a Web shop to communicate with PayPal: using a
token or using GET parameter transmission. For both methods,
the logs indicate there exist a number of different PayPal API end-
points for the Web shops to use. Table 3 shows their distribution
over our dataset.
The most predominant endpoint (1) is the only one that is cur-
rently mentioned in the PayPal API help documents (PayPal
2014e). The second-most used endpoint (2) appears to be an older
endpoint; although we have no PayPal document confirming this,
there is exactly one mention in the online help. From the context,
it stands to reason that this was merely an oversight when updat-
ing the documentation. Endpoint 3 seems to exist to catch typos;
there is no mention of it in any PayPal documents. Endpoint 4
has a more distinctive name, but is likewise undocumented.
Finally, endpoint 5 is a localized version (‘‘/bg”). We see multiple
calls to such localized endpoints in the logs, but they generally for-
ward all data to endpoint 1. This Bulgarian endpoint did not, so we
included it as a special case.
Token usage is widespread: For endpoint 1, more than 84% of all
Websites employ one, and 86% across all endpoints. For such Web-
sites, we have to rely on the screenshots because PII leakage cannot
be inferred from the HTTP GET logs.4.6.2. Data accuracy
The PayPal API accepts various parameters, a subset of which is
reserved for the customer PII. While some of this is readily dis-
played on the PayPal login screen before payment, we also investi-
gated whether any PII was sent to PayPal by parsing the log files.
Based on the PayPal API help documents (PayPal 2014e), we deter-
mined all relevant parameters and parsed the logs for occurrences.
Table 3
Distribution of PayPal endpoints used by merchant sites.
PayPal endpoint URL Site count (with/
without token)
1 https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr 847 (731/116)
2 https://www.paypal.com/webscr 25 (18/17)
3 https://www.paypal.com/cgibin/webscr 4 (4/0)
4 https://www.paypal.com/checkoutnow 4 (4/0)




Leaked data by clusters ranked from good to bad privacy practices. The common leakage of product details is more worrying than the seeming absence of customer data: PayPal
collects identity details directly during payment. Leaked by: h = some sites, j = all sites, blank = no sites in that cluster.






C1 391 (44%) Leaks nothing or at most one item. h h h 0 1
C2 34 (4%) Leaks two of names, item numbers, and
prices.
h h h h 1 3
C3 292 (33%) Leaks at least names, item numbers, and
prices.
h h h h 3 4
C4 155 (18%) Leaks at least most product details and
always shipping costs.
j h j h h 4 5
C5 9 (1%) Leaks name and address in addition to
product details.
j h h h j h h 6 7
Table 2
Manual Website categorisation, including sub-types for commercial services.
Type Site count Subtype Site count
Retail 764
Commercial services 66 Website 20
Donations 25 Software 19
Dating 9 Educational 11
Events 8 Other 16
Airlines 6
Other 3
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whether the PayPal login screen always displays all PII that the
API receives over the GET query-string. We were able to confirm
that whenever customer or product data were leaked via GET, it
showed up on the PayPal login screen. The only exception was
for shipping costs of USD 0.00, which was forwarded but hidden
in 36 cases. This means the transcribed screenshots give an accu-
rate account of transmitted customer data.
4.6.3. Pure leakage patterns
After aggregating the screenshot and log data, three pure leak-
age patterns emerge. These pure patterns account for a total of 805
URLs (91%). The remaining 76 URLs form a long tail of 25 patterns,
none of which occurs more than 13 times, and 15 patterns occur
exactly once. With 338 out of 881 sites, the predominant pure pat-
tern leaks no data at all. The other two both leak the item names,
descriptions, numbers and the customer’s name to PayPal, with the
third also informing PayPal about the shipping costs.
4.6.4. Clustering of all leakage patterns
The leakage patterns form the backbone of our work. In order to
analyse the data more deeply, we shorten the long tail of these pat-
terns and reduce the number of distinct patterns by clustering all
881 URLs into only a few classes.
While the three pure leakage patterns identified above have
very intuitive descriptions, a k-Means clustering (Filkov and
Skiena 2004) failed to identify similarly meaningful patterns for
any value of k. We thus resorted to EM clustering (Dempster
et al. 1977), which automatically determines the appropriate num-
ber of clusters. The result is shown in Table 1.
4.6.5. Integration patterns by cluster
A natural question is whether a particular combination of end-
point and token usage enforces or prevents leakage. Analysing the
clusters, it becomes obvious that there is no such relationship:
None of the clusters are homogeneous with respect to endpoints
and tokens, except for C2, which does not contain any token
implementations.
Privacy-friendly Websites tend to use a token more often: 98%
of all Websites in Cluster C1 were using a token, compared to
86% and 85% for C3 and C4, respectively (p < 0.0001, two-tailed
Fisher’s exact test).
We observe that no Websites leaking customer addresses rely
on a token implementation. With a sample size of nine this holds
little statistical significance, but we found no indication in the
API documentation that this is a requirement on PayPal’s side.
We used the association rule mining algorithm Apriori (Hipp
et al. 2000) to see whether the cluster membership of a Web shop
correlates with its implementation. Requiring a confidence of atleast 0.4, the resulting rules did not consistently link the usage of
a token or an endpoint to any degree of privacy-friendliness. We
conclude that PayPal’s available API methods do not bias Web
shops to treat customers’ privacy in a specific way.4.6.6. Leakage patterns by Website category
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the Website categories. The dis-
tribution of Website categories per cluster largely reflects the over-
all distribution over the data set. No clear trends can be identified,
although a large majority of donation sites sit unnecessarily in the
privacy-unfriendly C3. Commercial services are also mainly found
in this cluster. While the leaked PII is necessary for this category
of Websites, we do not see an immediate need to forward them
to PayPal.
Prediction from the category of the Website showed no pro-
mise. With the exceptions outlined above, all clusters proved to
be too mixed, and Apriori failed to produce rules with a confidence
of even 0.4. Hinting towards a variety of attitudes towards privacy
among Web shops, this is a positive result for customers.
Looking at the product categories associated with the Websites
found in each cluster, C3 contains categories from all over the
category tree. C5 and C2 generally have too few entries to make
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both contain a lot of clothing and related items. While C1 has some
home appliances in it, C4 has a tendency towards personal health
products, including sports products.
Looking at Website popularity and quality, we found that tech-
nical implementation quality has no immediate bearing on cluster
membership. Rather, we see that the number of sites from a certain
cluster scale with the overall number of sites in the speed per-
centile. We further see that the distribution of sites from the clus-
ters over the percentile bins follow no specific pattern. It can thus
not be said that the speed of a Website has a positive correlation
with its privacy-friendliness.
Less popular sites are found significantly more often in clusters
that exhibit more leakage. More popular sites tend to leak less. For
illustrative purposes, the average traffic rank is 0.4 million for C1,
1.0 million for C3 and 1.4 million for C4. A Mann–Whitney U test
indicates a highly significant difference in the traffic ranks per clus-
ter (p = 0.001 for both pairwise comparisons). Sites in the worst
leakage C5 do not appear among the 50 highest ranked in our sam-
ple (Fig. 3).4.6.7. Third-party tracking facilitated by PayPal
Analysis of the HTTP traffic observed during the experiments
revealed the use of Adobe’s Omniture tracking software on PayPal
checkout pages. When a user lands on the PayPal checkout page,
two HTTP requests are sent to paypal.d1.sc.omtrdc.net and pay-
pal.112.2o7.net subdomains, both of which belong to Adobe’s
Omniture tracking software (Adobe Systems Incorporated, Digital
marketing|Adobe Marketing Cloud 2014). The requests contain
metadata about the payment to be made, such as currency and
transaction token, along with the user’s browser characteristics
such as plugins, screen dimensions and software versions (Adobe
Systems Incorporated 2014). Remarkably, PayPal also shares the
referrer URL of the checkout page, which reveals the URL of the
Web shop, and potentially the product to be purchased. This leak-
age enables Adobe to build a better profile of 152 million PayPal
users (PayPal 2014a), by combining payment details with other
online activities recorded on more than 300,000 Omniture-
tracked Websites (BuiltWith Pty Ltd 2014), which notably includes
50 of the Web shops analysed in this study.Fig. 3. Cluster membership over the sites’ popNote that the leakage described here is different from the indi-
rect information leakage via referrer headers as studied in
Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009b), since the PayPal checkout page
actively collects and sends the referrer of the checkout page, which
would not be shared otherwise with the Omniture domains. Fur-
thermore, by sending high-entropy browser properties such as plu-
gins and screen dimensions, PayPal makes it possible for Omniture
to track users by their browser fingerprints even if they block or
delete their cookies (Eckersley 2010).
According to its privacy policy, PayPal may share customers’
personal information with third-party service providers (PayPal
2013e) who are limited to using PayPal customers’ information
‘‘in connection with the services they perform for [PayPal].”
Assuming the information shared with Omniture is subject to a
similar agreement, it is hard to make sure whether payment infor-
mation, product URL or browser characteristics are interpreted as
personal information or not, given the possible interpretations of
the policy and lack of transparency around PayPal’s contracts with
third-parties.
As of September 14th, 2014, long after we finished with the
experiments, the PayPal checkout page no longer references a
third-party tracker, though Omniture is still used on the PayPal
homepage (see Appendix for reproduction).4.6.8. Flash evercookies and browser fingerprinting for internal
tracking
We also found the use of two questionable tracking mecha-
nisms by PayPal internally, namely, evercookies and browser fin-
gerprinting. Upon registering for a new account, PayPal places a
Flash cookie named paypalLSO.sol, which includes a 70 character
long identifier string. On each visit to PayPal checkout page, this
Flash cookie is read by an invisible Flash object (mid.swf) and
appended to the payment form as a hidden element.
Evercookies (also known as supercookies or zombie cookies)
make use of obscure browser storage mechanisms to store tracking
identifiers. Being a resilient tracking technology, evercookies can
be used to restore standard (HTTP) cookies intentionally removed
or blocked by users. In the past, use of such techniques led to law-
suits and multi-million dollar settlements (Singel 2010).ularity (traffic ranks) found in the sample.
Fig. 4. Also sites that sell sensitive products leak product details to PayPal. Two examples of adult toys (finger rimmer, vibrator) and medication: 5-HTP addresses depression,
anxiety, sleep disorders, and MDMA hangover; acetyl carnitine is used for many indications including Alzheimer’s disease and depression.
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employed by PayPal
Through a field study, EFF’s Panopticlick study showed that
combining multiple browser properties, one can extract a finger-
printing that can be used to track users without relying on the
stored identifiers such as cookies (Eckersley 2010).
When a user visits the PayPal checkout page, a script (pa.js) col-
lects multiple browser properties including browser plugins,
screen dimensions and 36 different Windows ActiveX components
to get information about the installed software and language pack-
ages. The Appendix lists the properties collected by PayPal’s script.
Unfortunately, PayPal’s privacy policy is not as explicit about fin-
gerprinting as it is for Flash cookies.
Despite using the same technology, the assessment of PayPal’s
user re-identification through persistent cookies has to be more
favourable than third-party online tracking. In a payment scenario,
these advanced tracking techniques can be used to prevent account
hijacking or similar fraudulent activities. PayPal’s privacy policy
explains that ‘‘cookies, pixel tags, ‘Flash cookies,’ or other local
storage [. . .]” are used to ‘‘recognize you as a customer; customize
PayPal Services, content, and advertising; measure promotional
effectiveness; [. . .] mitigate risk and prevent fraud [. . .].” (PayPal
2013e). Nonetheless, for a company that manages millions of pay-
ments each day, there are many improvements to make, beginningfrom preventing information leakage to third parties, being more
transparent about in-house tracking mechanisms and strictly iso-
lating the use of advanced tracking tools to combat fraud.4.6.10. Responses received from the merchants
After the full data analysis was completed, we tried to contact a
sample of 59 online retailers for which the proliferation of pur-
chase details could be particularly embarrassing, including adult
entertainment, pest control, shape-wear, vitamins and medication.
We used the same text across all shops in our request, and asked:
‘‘What data do you transfer to PayPal when a customer of your
shop decides to use that payment option for a purchase?” We
clearly mentioned ‘‘the context of a scientific study on online pay-
ment providers”.
Most retailers could be contacted by email (38 shops, 64%); for
17 shops (29%), we had to use an online contact form. Four shops
(7%) provided no means of getting in touch. A single merchant
replied the next day and explained that they ‘‘transfer the absolute
minimal data that is required by Paypal” (sic!), which however was
not consistent with our records. No other shops replied to our
enquiry within four weeks (or any time after for that matter);
twelve auto-replies were received but never followed by an actual
response.
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for consumers who are left alone with their privacy concerns. Fur-
thermore, the only retailer who made an effort to reply seemed
unaware of more far-reaching data proliferation. This might sug-
gest that merchants need tools to identify data flows, and better
guidance on how to implement a privacy-friendly checkout proce-
dure. Our article aims to help with both issues.
4.6.11. Limitations
As outlined above, our sampling strategy combined Web shop
URLs from different sources to cover both larger and smaller mer-
chants. We expect our dataset to contain an equal distribution over
more and less professional Websites, as well as more and less fre-
quented ones. The Websites we analysed are sites that are actually
visited by Web users, as the sampling was guided by browsing ses-
sion logs.
This comes at the price of diversity of goods that are sold. As
expected and confirmed by our manual categorisation of Web-
sites, there are more Web shops selling physical goods than there
are commercial dating Websites. As a result, our categories are
not evenly distributed over the dataset at all. This makes statisti-
cally significant statements about privacy practices hard, if not
impossible. The non-existence of association rules with high con-
fidence is an immediate result of the skewed distribution of
categories.
Further breaking down the manually assigned categories into a
more fine-grained version was done in a semi-automated way. This
is necessarily prone to errors, stemming from incomplete or faulty
inferences from the information provided by the Amazon Product
Advertising API. Naturally, this API can only deliver information
based on Amazon’s product range. Labelling our dataset using this
information will again be biased: Our method for assigning labels
to Websites discarded relatively infrequent labels. The biggest
problem here is not primarily that we may not have enough shops
per label in our dataset, but rather that the labels may be infre-
quent because Amazon has few goods from a certain category.
Again, under a skewed distribution, statistical significance is diffi-
cult to obtain.
For obvious reasons, our data collection setup could not cover
server-to-server communication, which, according to PayPal docu-
mentation (PayPal 2014e), can be used by merchants to communi-
cate with PayPal. Also, in our experiments we did not go beyond
the PayPal checkout page to complete the payments. As a result,
the data collected and leaked after the PayPal checkout page are
not covered in our analysis.5. Conclusion and discussion
We presented a new species in the zoo of online tracking sys-
tems: explicit leakage of personal information and detailed shop-
ping habits from online merchants to payment providers. In
contrast to the widely debated tracking of Web browsing, online
shops make it impossible for their customers to avoid this prolifer-
ation of their data.
By mediating online payments between merchants and buyers,
payment providers are in a position to access sensitive payment
details that can be used to build a detailed profile of shopping
habits. Being the most popular payment provider, PayPal learns
how much money its 152 million customers are spending and
where. These customers are identified by name, email and postal
address and through their bank details. We have demonstratedthat merchant Websites are unnecessarily forwarding product
details to PayPal that give a detailed view on consumers’
purchases.
According to the 881 sites studied in our analysis, 52% of the
most popular US Web shops shared product names, item num-
bers and descriptions with PayPal. Besides the negative privacy
impact, consumers whose data are proliferating could suffer
from less favourable payment terms (e.g., unavailable payment
methods of higher interest rates on consumer loans based on
their purchase patterns). On the other hand, the remaining 388
sites did not share any purchase details except the amount to
be paid, confirming that sharing sensitive details is not necessary
for electronic retailers.
Further, we reported on the PayPal’s use of the tracking service
Omniture, which amplifies the privacy concerns by exposing trans-
action details to a widely deployed third-party tracker. A third-
party tracker that has access to general Web tracking information,
as well as to the details of successfully completed transactions, is
in a particularly privileged situation to monitor consumption
choices at large.
Web shops that use the technically more advanced token-based
integration are often more privacy-friendly. Also, less popular sites
are significantly more often among those that leak more personal
information. There are no systematic differences across product
categories, meaning that all kinds of shoppers are exposed.
To the extent that PayPal, as an example of payment providers
in general, collects personal information at scale, it becomes a con-
stituent part of the online shopping experience: neither research-
ers nor enforcement authorities can reduce its role to a passive
intermediary when assessing the privacy impact of e-commerce
transactions.
By exploring the alternative privacy preserving practices that
can be followed by Web shops, we distilled the following sug-
gestions for merchants: (1) apply the data minimization princi-
ple—do not leak information that is not required for processing
the transaction; (2) inform customers about the data sharing in
your privacy policy; (3) offer alternative, privacy-friendly pay-
ment methods, such as direct debit or pre-payment; (4) use a
payment gateway to prevent leakage of product URL via referrer
header.
Future research through qualitative interviews with decision-
makers and engineers at merchants should look at the drivers
and motives behind PayPal integration choices and their privacy
consequences. On the technical side, expanding the scope to
mobile and in-app payments promises valuable for these growing,
yet opaque transactions. Better privacy practices for handling
online payments are not only desirable for end users, but also for
the merchants and payment providers whose businesses depend
on the users’ trust.
At times when personal information is said to be new currency
on the Web, it seems unfair that consumers are charged twice dur-
ing checkout.Appendix
A sample HTTP request collected during the experiments
(a) Request URL https://paypal.d1.sc.omtrdc.net/b/ss/paypal-
global/1/H.25.3/s68449009894746?AQB=1&ndh=1 [trimmed –
see below].
(b) Request parameters (URL decoded)
62 S. Preibusch et al. / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 15 (2016) 52–64Listing 1. The request parameters sent to Adobe’s Omniture track-
ing suite domain (omtrdc.net) leaks the product name and ID as a
part of the referrer URL (parameter r). The plugin details, screen
dimensions, browser window size and software versions are col-
lected and sent to the tracking endpoint.Browser properties collected by the PayPal analytics script pa.js
Script URL: https://www.paypalobjects.com/pa/js/pa.js
 User Agent string (navigator.userAgent)
 File name, description and version of installed browser plugins
 Browser plug-ins (navigator.plugins)
 All content types that the browser can handle (navigator.
mimeTypes.type)
 Screen resolution and colour depth, browser window width &
height
 JavaScript version Version numbers of 36 different Windows ActiveX components
such as Outlook Express, MSN Messenger Service and Microsoft
virtual machine
Data collection setup
We used a consistent setup to capture the information that
merchants share with PayPal when their customers proceed to
checkout.
Virtual machine: We used a clean virtual machine for each ses-
sion in a best effort to prevent profiling by cookies or other client
side data.
Proxy: We used mitmproxy (Mitmproxy Project 2013) for inter-
cepting and recording Web traffic. By adding mitmproxy’s certifi-
cates to the browser, we recorded all HTTP(S) requests and
responses in decrypted form, including message bodies. We stored
the network dump (.dmp) generated by mitmproxy to enable play-
back of the exact Web traffic. This helped us to ensure the repro-
ducibility of our analysis.
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to relay all communications through the intercepting proxy. The
browser configuration was slightly modified from the default, as
explained below; however, all privacy-related settings were left
unchanged, simulating a default user.
Browser add-ons: Data collection was supported by browser
add-ons for auto-filling forms and capturing the screen. ‘Autofill
Forms’ (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/autofill-
forms/) helped us by quickly providing various information we
are expected to fill in to forms on shopping sites. The use of the
form-filler also ensured the same profile data was used on every
site. We used ‘Screengrab’ (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/fire-
fox/addon/screengrab-fix-version/) to take the screen capture of
the PayPal page we were redirected to complete the payment.
Browser configuration: The browser configuration was kept
closely to the default to mimic the privacy exposure of a main-
stream user. We therefore kept all privacy-related settings
unchanged and used the default non-private browsing mode. We
continued to allow popups, Flash, Silverlight and Java (if available)
and did not actively block script execution. We allowed and
recorded requests to phishing/malware databases, which are
enabled by the original settings.
At the same time, the following options were turned off to pre-
vent cluttering of the recorded Web traffic: auto-update search
engines, spell checking, crash report, Firefox health report and
OCSP certificate verification.
Proxifying script: We used a Python script to launch mitm-
proxy and the browser with the product URL. The same script
was used for parsing the network dump captured by mitmproxy
and for outputting the captured HTTP(S) requests and responses
for further analysis. The logs generated by the script were fed to
a parser script that mined the data in the Web traffic and detected
information flows.
Reproducing the original Omniture tracking on PayPal’s checkout
pages
Note that the PayPal checkout pages from the Internet Archive
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